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Abstract
As a method for answer aggregation in crowdsourced data management, rank aggregation
aims to combine different agents’ answers or preferences over the given alternatives into an
aggregate ranking which agrees the most with the preferences. However, since the aggregation
procedure relies on a data curator, the privacy within the agents’ preference data could be
compromised when the curator is untrusted. Existing works that guarantee differential privacy
in rank aggregation all assume that the data curator is trusted. In this paper, we formulate
and address the problem of locally differentially private rank aggregation, in which the agents
have no trust in the data curator. By leveraging the approximate rank aggregation algorithm
KwikSort, the Randomized Response mechanism, and the Laplace mechanism, we propose an
effective and efficient protocol LDP-KwikSort. Theoretical and empirical results show that the
solution LDP-KwikSort:RR can achieve the acceptable trade-off between the utility of aggregate
ranking and the privacy protection of agents’ pairwise preferences.
Keywords: Rank Aggregation, KwikSort Algorithm, Local Differential Privacy.
1 Introduction
Aggregation is the process of combining multiple inputs into a single output which represents all
inputs in some sense [7]. In crowdsourced data management, aggregation plays a crucial role: by
aggregating the answers (can be seen as preferences) from crowd agents, the crowdsourcing platforms
have able to address some computer-hard tasks such as entity resolution, sentiment analysis, and
image recognition [30]. In the research of computational social choice, one main research issue is on
how to better aggregate the preferences of individual agents, or the participating decision-makers [9].
It provides voting-based solutions to the answer aggregation problems which often involve multiple
individual preferences that could be conflicting. Since the preferences of individual agents are often
represented as rank data where the alternatives are ranked in order, the rank aggregation has been
a topic with broad interests in related applications.
Since most preferences data are inevitably involved with sensitive information of individual
agents, the collecting, analyzing, and publishing of these data would be a potential threat to the
individual’s privacy. For instance, due to its appealing properties, Amazon’s crowdsourcing platform
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Mechanical Turk has been an important research tool for social sciences such as psychology and
sociology [6, 5, 3, 44, 37, 39, 40]. The researchers can design and post questionnaires through the
platform and recruit examinees to finish online testings. However, existing studies show that there are
potential risks of data disclosure within Mechanical Turk [28, 26, 51, 41]. Even though the disclosure
of an individual’s preferences is not always embarrassing, the ability to deduce them may make those
agents susceptible to coercion. These factors prevent the contributions of accurate preferences from
individual agents and inhibit the performance of the aggregation from being fully realized. However,
this concern cannot be comprehensively addressed by traditional privacy-preserving methods such
as anonymization, as evidenced by the Hugo Awards 2015 incident [18, 21] in which the adversary
can conduct a linkage attack when s/he has gained unexpected background knowledge of victims.
Considering the above weakness of anonymization techniques and especially in the scenario of
aggregate ranking release, two recent works [43, 21] adopted the rigorous differential privacy (DP)
framework [17, 31, 53, 54], and proposed several differentially private rank aggregation algorithms.
Based on the properties of the central model of DP, the data curator is assumed to be fully trusted
and can access all agents’ ranking preference profiles, while the adversary with any background
knowledge could not confidently infer the existence of an agent’s profile from the aggregate ranking
released by the curator.
However, with the increased awareness of privacy preservation in data collection, both the
academic and industrial communities are getting more interested in the local model of DP (LDP)
[27, 14, 15] where the curator is assumed to be untrusted. An intuitive comparison between these
two models is shown in Figure 1. Within the LDP model, the agents could add noise by using the
designed local randomizer before reporting their preference profiles Li to the curator, who could
also estimate the population statistics from the noisy data. More specifically, in this paper, we are
addressing the following problem called locally differentially private rank aggregation (LDP-RA): the
agents have their ranking preferences over the given alternatives and the curator with the authority
and computing capability will collect and aggregate those preference profiles into a final overall
ranking list. When the agents are not trusting the curator’s capability of preventing their privacy
from potential attacks, the challenges for a private rank aggregation are then on a) how to enable
the agents to avoid sharing their original ranking preference profiles with the untrusted curator, and
b) how to enable the curator to approximately aggregate those rankings with an acceptable utility.
The main contribution of our work is LDP-KwikSort, an effective and efficient LDP protocol for
the LDP-RA problem.
1. Instead of adding noise into the whole ranking list on each agent’s side, we focus on protecting
the pairwise comparison preferences within the ranking list. To achieve that, we leverage on
the approximate rank aggregation algorithm KwikSort [1, 2], which only requires the input
as agents’ pairwise preferences. Based on this, the protocol allows the untrusted curator to
ask the agents with pairwise comparison queries and lets the agents report their differentially
private answers with the RR mechanism or the Laplace mechanism. By the post-processing
algorithm, the untrusted data curator can approximately estimate the useful frequencies for
rank aggregation and further output an aggregate ranking.
2. When adopting the RR mechanism and Laplace mechanism as the local randomizer for
constructing the local perturbation algorithm, it comes up with the question of how should
we choose an appropriate number of queries K which is also the times of invoking the local
randomizer. By analyzing the estimation error bound of aggregate pairwise comparison profile
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Figure 1: Comparison of two DP models
cmp(L) in the LDP-KwikSort protocol, we show that the utility can achieve the approximate
maximum value around K = 2 , which is then further verified by extensive experiments.
3. For performance evaluation, we conduct experiments on three real-world datasets (TurkDots,
TurkPuzzle and SUSHI) and several synthetic datasets generated from the Mallows model. By
observing the error rate and the average Kendall tau distance resulted from the two solutions
of LDP-KwikSort, the central model based solution DP-KwikSort [21] and the non-private
KwikSort, it shows that our protocol especially the solution LDP-KwikSort:RR can achieve
strong local privacy protection while maintaining an acceptable utility.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the background on non-private
and private rank aggregation, local differential privacy and its relaxed definition. Section 3 reviews
the related work on differentially private voting mechanisms. Section 4 formalizes the LDP-RA
problem and proposes the LDP-KwikSort protocol, followed by theoretical analysis in Section 5,
empirical analysis in Section 6, and conclusions in Section 7.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the relevant concepts of rank aggregation, private rank aggregation, the
building blocks of LDP protocol, and a relaxation of differential privacy. Table 1 lists the notations
used in this paper.
2.1 Rank Aggregation
Given a set of m alternatives A = {a1, ..., am} and n agents participated in a preference aggregation
procedure, the preference profile of an agent i is represented as a permutation or a ranking Li ∈ L(A)
of those m alternatives. Hence, the ranking index of alternative aj in Li is denoted by L
−1
i (aj)
with a value between 0 (the best) to m− 1 (the worst). Then a combined profile of these ranking
preference profiles is denoted by L = (L1, ..., Ln) ∈ L(A)n, based on which, the rank aggregation
algorithm generates a representative ranking L(L) that sufficiently summarizes L.
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Table 1: Notations
N set of agent i, where N = {1, ..., n}
A set of alternative aj , where A = {a1, ..., am}
L(A) all the possible permutations of elements in A
Li ranking preference profile of agent i, where Li ∈ L(A)
L−1i (aj) ranking index of alternative aj in Li
L combined profile of all the agents’ preferences
L(L) aggregate ranking over the given combined profile L
K(L(L), Li) Kendall tau distance between L(L) and Li
K(L(L),L) average Kendall tau distance between L(L) and L
Cajal(L) count of the times that L
−1(aj) < L−1(al) in L
cmpL(aj , al) computing Cajal(L)− Calaj (L)
cmp(L) set of all the values of cmpL(aj , al)
L˜P aggregate ranking by the proposed protocol
 overall privacy budget for each agent
K number of queries from the curator to each agent
θ dispersion parameter of the Mallows model
To evaluate the quality of the aggregate ranking L(L), Kendall tau distance is commonly used to
count the number of pairwise disagreements between two rankings: K(L(L), Li) = |{(aj , al) : aj <
al, L
−1
(L)(aj) < L
−1
(L)(al) but L
−1
i (aj) > L
−1
i (al)}|. Then given the combined profile L, its average
Kendall tau distance with an aggregate ranking L(L) is defined as: K(L(L),L) =
1
n
∑
i∈N K(L(L), Li).
When the above distance achieves the minimum, the relevant L(L) is referred to as the Kemeny
optimal aggregate ranking. However, it is NP-hard to compute this kind of ranking when n > 3, and
various approximate algorithms have been proposed as summarized in [8].
In this paper, we leverage on a Kendall tau distance based algorithm, KwikSort, which could
achieve 11/7-approximation by adopting the QuickSort strategy [2]. Specifically, the sorting of
any two alternatives aj , al ∈ A is based on the counts of how many times aj (resp. al) is preferred
over al (resp. aj) among the rankings in L, which is formally defined as Cajal(L) = |{for all Li ∈
L|L−1i (aj) < L−1i (al)}| and Calaj (L) = |{for all Li ∈ L|L−1i (al) < L−1i (aj)}|. Upon execution,
KwikSort would first randomly pick an alternative ap ∈ A as the pivot, then classify all alternatives
aq ∈ A \ {ap} using the comparison function cmpL(ap, aq) =
(
Capaq(L)− Caqap(L)
) ∈ cmp(L). That
is, if cmpL(ap, aq) < 0, the alternative aq would be classified into the left side of the pivot ap, and
vice versa. In particular, when cmpL(ap, aq) = 0, this placement can be done randomly. This
procedure repeats until all alternatives have been sorted into a ranking LKS . In the experiments of
this paper, we adopt the Python package pwlistorder to help implement KwikSort algorithm, and
the randomized placement method is adopted instead of its default method that directly places aq
after ap if cmpL(ap, aq) = 0.
2.2 Private Rank Aggregation
Rank aggregation under the differential privacy framework is relatively new in the relevant community.
[43, 21] considered the central model of DP in which the trusted data curator has access to all agents’
ranking preference profiles and would release the aggregate ranking by applying a differentially
private algorithm M on them:
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Definition 1 (-differential privacy [16]). A randomized algorithm M satisfies -differential privacy
if for all O ⊆ Range(M) and for all neighboring datasets L and L′ differing on at most one record
Li (i.e., the ranking preference profile of agent i), we have
Pr[M(L) ∈ O] ≤ e · Pr[M(L′) ∈ O].
The intuition behind the above definition is that the adversary cannot confidently distinguish
two outputs (aggregate rankings) of the differentially private algorithm M on a dataset L and its
neighboring dataset L′, where L,L′ ∈ D. Then the present or absent status of any agent’s ranking
as a record within the input dataset is rigorously protected with the uncertainty of the algorithm’s
outputs, which is measured by the privacy budget .
To satisfy the definition of differential privacy and for those query functions f with numeric
output, the Laplace mechanism is usually utilized. Relying on the strategy of adding the Laplacian
random variables (noise) to the query result, the Laplace mechanism can be formally defined as
follows:
Definition 2 (Laplace mechanism [16]). Given a function f : D → Rk, the Laplace mechanism is
defined as
MLap(L) = f(L) + (X1, ..., Xk),
where Xi is i.i.d random variables drawn from Lap(
∆gf
 ), and the global sensitivity of f is ∆gf =
max
L,L′∈D
‖L−L′‖1=1
‖f(L)− f(L′)‖1.
2.3 Local Differential Privacy
Unlike the central model, in the local model of DP [27, 14, 15], each agent would first locally perturb
his/her data by adopting a randomized algorithm, referred to as the local randomizer MR, which
satisfies -differential privacy. Then, the agent would upload the perturbed data to the untrusted
curator, who should not infer the sensitive information of each agent but can post-process those
data to obtain the population statistics for further analysis. The local differential privacy is formally
defined as follows:
Definition 3 (-local differential privacy [17, 4]). For a protocol P and dataset D = (D1, ..., Dn),
if P accesses D only via K invocations of a local randomizer MR and each invocation satisfies
k-differential privacy, which means that for any neighboring pair of datasets Di, D
′
i ∈ D and
∀O ⊆ Range(MR), if MR satisfies
Pr[MR(Di) ∈ O] ≤ ek · Pr[MR(D′i) ∈ O]
and
∑K
k=1 k ≤ , then the protocol P(·) ,
(
M(1)R (·),M(2)R (·), . . . ,M(K)R (·)
)
satisfies -local differen-
tial privacy (-LDP).
To design LDP protocols, the randomized response (RR) mechanism [49, 19, 10] has been
widely adopted. As an indirect questioning mechanism for sensitive questionnaires, RR allows the
participating agents i ∈ N to answer questions with plausible deniability. Specifically, assume that
the true answers for vi is binary vi ∈ {0, 1}, each agent answers truthfully ui = vi with probability
5
e
e+1 , and falsely ui = vi with probability
1
e+1 [48, 22, 47]. These probabilities pui,vi then constitute
a transformation matrix as
M =
(
p0,0 p0,1
p1,0 p1,1
)
=
( e
e+1
1
e+1
1
e+1
e
e+1
)
.
Based on the knowledge of M, once obtaining y0 (or y1), the number of agents who answer ‘0’
(or ‘1’), the curator can use the unbiased maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) [23, 20, 42] to obtain
an estimation x̂0 (or x̂1), which approximates the number of agents whose true answer are ‘0’ (or
‘1’). −→̂
X = M−1
−→
Y , (1)
where
−→̂
X = (x̂0, x̂1)
τ ,
−→
Y = (y0, y1)
τ , and M−1 is the inverse matrix of M.
2.4 A Relaxation of Differential Privacy
Since the standard definition of differential privacy requires the strict distortion of analytical results
which may lead to the significant reduction of utility in practical implementations, several relaxed
definitions of differential privacy have been proposed such as the (, δ)-differential privacy, the
individual differential privacy, and the Re´nyi differential privacy. Among them, the individual
differential privacy (iDP) focuses on the indistinguishability between the actual dataset and its
neighboring datasets instead of any pair of neighboring datasets, which is defined as follows:
Definition 4 (-individual differential privacy [45]). Given a dataset L, a randomized algorithm
M satisfies -individual differential privacy if for all O ⊆ Range(M) and for any dataset L′ that is
a neighbor of L, we have
Pr[M(L) ∈ O] ≤ e · Pr[M(L′) ∈ O].
To satisfy the -iDP, the Laplace mechanism can be also applied, but the sensitivity of a given
function f in Definition 2 should be replaced with the local sensitivity:
Definition 5 (Local sensitivity [38]). Given a function f : D → Rd, its local sensitivity at L is
∆lf(L) = max
y:‖L−y‖1=1
‖f(L)− f(y)‖1.
If we consider the individual differential privacy under the local model, it is natural to obtain
the definition of the local individual differential privacy (LiDP) as follows:
Definition 6 (-local individual differential privacy). For a protocol P and dataset D = (D1, ..., Dn),
if P accesses D only via K invocations of a local randomizer MR and each invocation satisfies
k-individual differential privacy, which means that for any neighboring dataset D
′
i of the given
dataset Di and ∀O ⊆ Range(MR), if MR satisfies
Pr[MR(Di) ∈ O] ≤ ek · Pr[MR(D′i) ∈ O]
and
∑K
k=1 k ≤ , then the protocol P(·) ,
(
M(1)R (·),M(2)R (·), ...,M(K)R (·)
)
satisfies -local differential
privacy (-LiDP).
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3 Related Work
In this section, we review some representative works on differentially private voting mechanisms.
Under the central model of DP, Chen et al. [11, 12] considered to model privacy in players utility
functions for achieving both of privacy preservation and truthfulness, and proposed mechanism
for private two-candidate election; Lee [29] proposed an algorithm that satisfies both -DP and
-strategyproof for tournament voting rules. Considering the rank aggregation scenario, Shang
et al. [43] introduced a relaxed DP definition, (, δ)-DP, into the differentially private algorithm
to release the histogram of rankings with the utility bounds analyzed. Then in the work of Hay
et al. [21], three differentially private algorithms were proposed by separately concentrating on the
approximate and the optimal rank aggregation. Among them, DP-KwikSort algorithm extends the
approximate rank aggregation algorithm KwikSort by the Laplace mechanism.
Under the local model of DP, the private algorithms for majority voting and truth discovery [32,
33], weighted voting [52], and positional voting [46] were designed. Besides, Liu et al. [34] explored
the theoretical relationship between the internal randomness of certain voting rules and the privacy-
preserving level. However, to the best of our knowledge, no existing work has been devoted to rank
aggregation under the local model of DP which is introduced in the next section.
4 Locally Private Rank Aggregation
In this section, we formalize the problem of locally differentially private rank aggregation (LDP-RA)
and then propose a solution called LDP-KwikSort protocol.
4.1 Problem Formalization
There are n agents that own their ranking profile Li over m alternatives. In the context of LDP-RA,
the combined profile L = (L1, ..., Ln) can be considered as an instantiation of D = (D1, ..., Dn)
in Definition 3. The task is then to design a local randomizerMR which locally perturbs each agent’s
ranking preference profile Li before reporting to the untrusted curator. On the other hand, we expect
that the constituted -LDP protocol (or -LiDP protocol) P outputs the aggregate ranking L˜P with an
acceptable utility as measured by the average Kendall tau distance K(L˜P ,L) = 1n
∑
i∈N K(L˜P , Li).
4.2 Protocol Overview
To solve the LDP-RA problem, we propose the locally differentially private KwikSort (LDP-KwikSort)
protocol which contains two solutions: LDP-KwikSort:RR and LDP-KwikSort:Lap, and the rationale
of the former can be summarized in Figure 2.
When executing the LDP-KwikSort protocol, K rounds of interactions exist between every agent
and the curator. In each interaction, the curator randomly selects K different pairs of alternatives
for querying, and the agent reports the answer. These queries are predefined as do you prefer the
alternative aj to al?. When receiving the query, the agent adopts RR mechanism to report the
perturbed answer (Algorithm 1). After collecting the answers from all agents, the curator aggregates
these data and estimates the needed statistics which can be further used by the KwikSort algorithm.
Finally, the KwikSort algorithm is executed to generate an aggregate ranking (Algorithm 2).
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Figure 2: Rationale for LDP-KwikSort:RR Solution
4.3 Local Perturbation
As shown in Algorithm 1, when receiving the K queries, an agent i ∈ N adopts the standard RR
mechanism as the local randomizer MR, and reports the curator with the perturbed answer o˜i.
Here, we adopt the transformation matrix Mrr introduced in Section 2.3 to include the coin flipping
probabilities po˜ik,oik of a true answer oik being transformed into the reported answer o˜ik. Let Mrr
be the common knowledge of the agents and the curator:
Mrr =
(
p0,0 p0,1
p1,0 p1,1
)
=
(
prr 1− prr
1− prr prr
)
where all the diagonal elements get assigned the value prr while 1 − prr for other elements, and
prr =
ek
ek+1 , k = /K.
Algorithm 1 Local Perturbation in LDP-KwikSort:RR
Input: Agent i’s ranking profile Li, K queries, transformation matrix Mrr
Output: Agent i’s perturbed answer o˜i
1: Receives K queries (e.g., do you prefer alternative aj to al? ) from curator
2: for each query k ∈ [K] do
3: Randomly generates a number g from [0, 1] . Local Randomizer MR
4: if g ≤ prr then
5: o˜ik ← 1
6: else
7: o˜ik ← 0
8: end if
9: end for
10: Agent i reports the perturbed answer o˜i = {o˜i1, ..., o˜iK} to curator
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4.4 Post-processing
As shown in Algorithm 2, once collected the answers from the agents, firstly (Line 1−9), the curator
classifies these noisy data. For each possible pair of alternatives aj and al, two counters C˜ajal(L)
and C˜alaj (L) are updated to indicate the numbers of the agent who prefers alternative aj (or al) to
alternative al (or aj). Secondly (Line 10 − 13), the curator obtains the estimations of Cajal(L)
and Calaj (L) by Equation (1), where
−→̂
X =
(
Ĉajal(L), Ĉalaj (L)
)
,
−→
Y =
(
C˜ajal(L), C˜alaj (L)
)τ
. Then
the results from the comparison function ĉmpL(aj , al) can be computed. Finally (Line 14 − 15),
the curator assembles all the values of ĉmpL(aj , al) into the estimated version of aggregate pairwise
comparison profile ĉmp(L). By taking ĉmp(L) as input, the standard KwikSort algorithm is executed
to generate an aggregate ranking L˜P .
Algorithm 2 Post-processing in LDP-KwikSort:RR
Input: Agents’ perturbed answers o˜ = {o˜1, ..., o˜n}, transformation matrix Mrr
Output: Aggregate ranking L˜P
1: for o˜i ∈ o˜ do . Classification
2: for o˜ik ∈ o˜i do
3: if o˜ik = 1 then
4: C˜ajal(L) + 1
5: else
6: C˜alaj (L) + 1
7: end if
8: end for
9: end for
10: for each possible pair (aj , al) do . Estimation and computation
11: Obtains two estimations Ĉajal(L) and Ĉalaj (L) by Equation (1)
12: ĉmpL(aj , al)← Ĉajal(L)− Ĉalaj (L)
13: end for
14: Obtains ĉmp(L) and executes KwikSort algorithm
15: return Aggregate ranking L˜P
4.5 Laplace Solution
Since the agent i’s perturbed answer o˜i contains numeric values, we also propose the Laplace
mechanism based solution LDP-KwikSort:Lap.
Local perturbation. As shown in Algorithm 3, when receiving the K queries, an agent i ∈ N
adopts the Laplace mechanism as the local randomizer MR, and reports the curator with the
perturbed answer o˜i. Here, fo(·) is a query function which takes agent’s ranking preference as input
and outputs 1 or 0 to indicate whether this agent prefers aj to al or not, for default index j < l.
Then the local sensitivity ∆lfo is 1, which reflects the maximum change of its outputs.
Post-processing. As shown in Algorithm 4, once collected the answers from the agents, firstly
(Line 1− 9), the curator also classifies these noisy data. For each possible pair of alternatives aj and
al, two counters Ĉajal(L) and Ĉalaj (L) are updated. Note that these counters are the estimations of
Cajal(L) and Calaj (L), and the updates are based on judging whether o˜ik ≥ 0.5, which is different
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Algorithm 3 Local Perturbation in LDP-KwikSort:Lap
Input: Agent i’s ranking profile Li, K queries, privacy budget 
Output: Agent i’s perturbed answer o˜i
1: Receives K queries (e.g., do you prefer alternative aj to al? ) from curator
2: for each query k ∈ [K] do
3: o˜ik ← oik +Xldp where Xldp ∼ Lap(∆lfok ) . Local Randomizer MR
4: end for
5: Agent i reports the perturbed answer o˜i = {o˜i1, ..., o˜iK} to curator
from the approach in Algorithm 2. Secondly (Line 10− 12), the curator obtains ĉmpL(aj , al) by
directly subtracting Ĉalaj (L) from Ĉajal(L). Finally (Line 13− 14), the curator assembles all the
values of ĉmpL(aj , al) into the estimated version of aggregate pairwise comparison profile ĉmp(L).
By taking ĉmp(L) as input, the standard KwikSort algorithm is executed to generate an aggregate
ranking L˜P .
Algorithm 4 Post-processing in LDP-KwikSort:Lap
Input: Agents’ perturbed answers o˜ = {o˜1, ..., o˜n}
Output: Aggregate ranking L˜P
1: for o˜i ∈ o˜ do . Classification
2: for o˜ik ∈ o˜i do
3: if o˜ik ≥ 0.5 then
4: Ĉajal(L) + 1
5: else
6: Ĉalaj (L) + 1
7: end if
8: end for
9: end for
10: for each possible pair (aj , al) do . Computation
11: ĉmpL(aj , al)← Ĉajal(L)− Ĉalaj (L).
12: end for
13: Obtains ĉmp(L) and executes KwikSort algorithm
14: return Aggregate ranking L˜P
5 Theoretical Analysis
In this section, we provide the privacy and utility guarantees, as well as the computational complexity
of the proposed LDP-KwikSort protocol.
5.1 Privacy Guarantee
We have the following theorem on the privacy guarantee of the LDP-KwikSort protocol.
Theorem 1. LDP-KwikSort:RR satisfies -LDP and LDP-KwikSort:Lap satisfies -LiDP.
Proof. We respectively analyze two solutions of LDP-KwikSort protocol as follows:
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a. In the local perturbation algorithm, since the solution LDP-KwikSort:RR adopts the trans-
formation matrix based local randomizer MR to perturb each answer from the agent, we
have
Pr[MR(oik = u) = u]
Pr[MR(oik = v) = u] =
2prr
1− prr = e
k .
Based on Definition 1, we can conclude that the local randomizerMR in solution LDP-KwikSort:RR
satisfies k-DP.
b. In the local perturbation algorithm, since the solution LDP-KwikSort:Lap adopts the local
sensitivity based Laplace mechanism to design the local randomizer MR for perturbing each
answer from the agent, based on Definition 4, we can conclude that the local randomizer MR
in solution LDP-KwikSort:Lap satisfies k-iDP.
Consequently, according to Definition 3, we can conclude that LDP-KwikSort:RR satisfies -LDP
and LDP-KwikSort:Lap satisfies -LiDP, where  = K · k.
5.2 Utility Guarantee
5.2.1 Analysis of LDP-KwikSort:RR
As described in Algorithm 2, the post-processing procedure on the side of the curator mainly
contains two parts: the estimation of cmp(L) from the noisy data, and the execution of the KwikSort
algorithm. It is known that KwikSort can output an 11/7-optimal aggregate ranking with a given
aggregate pairwise comparison profile cmp(L). Therefore, it is important to measure the error of
estimating cmp(L) from the first part, which indicates the gap between the aggregate ranking L˜P
from KwikSort protocol and the 11/7-optimal aggregate ranking LKS . When investigating the
internal disagreements of the original aggregate pairwise comparison profile cmp(L) and its estimated
version ĉmp(L), we use Equation (1) to obtain
Mrr
−→̂
X =
−→
Y ,
That is (
prr 1− prr
1− prr prr
)(
Ĉajal(L)
Ĉalaj (L)
)
=
(
C˜ajal(L)
C˜alaj (L)
)
.
Expend the equation, we have
(2)
ĉmpL(aj , al) = Ĉajal(L)− Ĉalaj (L)
=
C˜ajal(L)− C˜alaj (L)
prr − (1− prr)
=
c˜mpL(aj , al)
2prr − 1 .
Since the denominator (2prr − 1) > 0 when k > 0, we can conclude that the sign of ĉmpL(aj , al)
is the same as that of c˜mpL(aj , al). As the KwikSort algorithm determines the relative order of
alternatives (aj , al) only by checking the sign of cmpL(aj , al), we turn to measure the probability
that the sign of c˜mpL(aj , al) is different with that of cmpL(aj , al). That is to say, the achieved utility
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of LDP-KwikSort relies on the condition that for the ground truth L−1(L)(aj) < L
−1
(L)(al) whether the
curator can directly obtain it by just observing the noisy data from the agents. Besides, when
c˜mpL(aj , al) and cmpL(aj , al) have the same sign, the difference between their absolute values will
not impact on the utility of solution LDP-KwikSort:RR.
Next, we present an error bound and the associated proof, which are based on the assumption
that the agents’ ranking preference profiles are generated by the Mallows model. The Mallows
model [35] is a probabilistic model for ranking generation in which the probability of generating a
ranking is based on the dispersion parameter θ ∈ [0, 1] and the distance between this ranking and a
ground truth ranking. Specifically, θ = 1− qMpM where pM ∈ [12 , 1] is the probability for generating
the relative order of alternatives (aj , al) which is consistent with the ground truth and qM = 1− pM
is the opposite probability.
Theorem 2. If all the ranking preference profiles are generated by the Mallows model with the
dispersion parameter θ and a ground truth ranking, the estimation of cmp(L) by LDP-KwikSort:RR
produces the error < 6µ with probability at least 1− 2−6µ, where µ = 2(m2 ) exp(− 2K(+2K)2 · θ∗2nm(m−1))
and θ∗ = θ2−θ .
Proof. In our scenario, for a certain pairwise comparison query such that ‘for alternative
pair (aj , al), whether L
−1
i (aj) < L
−1
i (al) or not’, there will be n
∗ = n K
(m2 )
agents involved, and
each agent reports his/her true answer (resp. false answer) with probability prr =
ek
ek+1 (resp.
qrr = 1− prr = 1ek+1). When considering the assumption regarding the Mallows model, an agent
finally reports the ground truth answer (i.e., L−1i (aj) < L
−1
i (al) for all j < l) with probability
p = pM · prr + qM · qrr and reports the opposite answer with probability q = pM · qrr + qM · prr.
Since the above procedure could be seen as a Bernoulli trial, here we adopt the variation of
Hoeffding’s inequality [50] for Bernoulli trial as follows:
Lemma 1. For a Bernoulli trial in which n times of experiment have been conducted and each
experiment outputs outcome A with probability p and outcome B with probability q = 1− p, we have
the following probability inequality for some δ > 0:
Pr[(p− δ)n ≤ H(n) ≤ (p + δ)n] ≥ 1− 2 exp(−2δ2n),
where H(n) is the number of outcome A in n experiments.
We then have the following probability inequalities by Lemma 1:
Pr[(p− δ)n∗ ≤ C˜ajal(L) ≤ (p + δ)n∗] ≥ 1− 2 exp(−2δ2n∗),
P r[(q− δ)n∗ ≤ C˜alaj (L) ≤ (q + δ)n∗] ≥ 1− 2 exp(−2δ2n∗),
and hence
Pr[(p− q− 2δ)n∗ ≤ C˜ajal(L)− C˜alaj (L) ≤ (p− q + 2δ)n∗] ≥ 1− 2 exp(−2δ2n∗).
If we let p− q = 2δ and θ∗ = θ2−θ , the following probability inequalities are obtained:
Pr[0 ≤ C˜ajal(L)− C˜alaj (L) ≤ 4δn∗] ≥ 1− 2 exp(−2δ2n∗)
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and
(3)
Pr[c˜mpL(aj , al) = C˜ajal(L)− C˜alaj (L) < 0]
< 2 exp(−2δ2n∗)
= 2 exp
(
−2(pM · prr + qM · qrr − pM · qrr − qM · prr
2
)2n∗
)
= 2 exp
(
−(prr − qrr)
2θ∗2n∗
2
)
≈ 2 exp
(
− 
2K
(+ 2K)2
· θ
∗2n
m(m− 1)
)
= Pι.
This formula reflects the error bound of generating data and reporting answers by n agents for a
certain pair of alternatives (aj , al). Here, we adopt the inequality e
x ≥ x + 1 for simplifying the
result in the last derivation.
After obtaining the error bound for a certain pairwise comparison query, we now apply the
following Chernoff bound for all the possible queries:
Lemma 2. Let X1, ..., Xn be independent Poisson trials such that Pr(Xi = 1) = pi. Let X =∑n
i=1Xi and µ = E[X]. Then for R ≥ 6µ,
Pr(X ≥ R) ≤ 2−R.
Therefore, we finish the proof with obtaining
µ = E[X] = E[
(m2 )∑
ι=1
Xι] =
(m2 )∑
ι=1
E[Xι] =
(m2 )∑
ι=1
Pι ≤ 2
(
m
2
)
exp
(
− 
2K
(+ 2K)2
· θ
∗2n
m(m− 1)
)
.
Based on Theorem 2, we can find that the estimation error of LDP-KwikSort:RR depends on
the expectation µ, and a smaller µ indicates a smaller error. Then we observe that 1) when the
privacy budget , the number of agents n and alternatives m, and the dispersion parameter θ are
fixed, µ is influenced by the function g(K) = 
2K
(+2K)2
, and it gets the approximate minimum value
when the number of queries K = 2 ; 2) when more agents are involved or given a large privacy
budget for each agent, i.e., n → ∞ or  → ∞, µ will be reduced to zero; 3) with increasing the
number of alternatives m, µ is also increased; 4) when the dispersion parameter θ is relatively large,
i.e., the generated rankings are closer to the ground truth ranking, we obtain a relatively small µ.
In Section 6, we conduct a series of experiments to verify these theoretical observations.
5.2.2 Analysis of LDP-KwikSort:Lap
As described in Algorithm 4, the post-processing procedure on the side of the curator also contains
two parts: the estimation of cmp(L) from the noisy data, and the execution of the KwikSort
algorithm. Its most difference with Algorithm 2 lies in using the threshold checking about o˜ik instead
of using Equation (1) to obtain Ĉajal(L) and Ĉalaj (L). Then we have the expressions regarding o˜ik:
o˜ik =

0, if oik + Lap(
∆lfo
k
) < 0.5,
1, if oik + Lap(
∆lfo
k
) ≥ 0.5.
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According to the cumulative distribution function of Laplacian random variables, we have the
probabilities of a true answer oi being transformed into the reported answer o˜i as
po˜ik,oik =

p0,0 = F (0.5) = 1− 12 exp(− k2 ),
p0,1 = 1− F (0.5) = 12 exp(− k2 ),
p1,0 = F (−0.5) = 12 exp(− k2 ),
p1,1 = 1− F (−0.5) = 1− 12 exp(− k2 ),
and we further have the following transformation matrix:
Mlap =
(
p0,0 p0,1
p1,0 p1,1
)
=
(
plap 1− plap
1− plap plap
)
,
where all the diagonal elements are assigned with the value plap while 1− plap for other elements,
and plap = 1− 12 exp(− k2 ), k = /K. Then we follow the analysis technique of LDP-KwikSort:RR
and replace prr with plap in Equation (3) to obtain the following conclusion:
Theorem 3. If all the ranking preference profiles are generated by the Mallows model with the dis-
persion parameter θ and a ground truth ranking, the estimation of cmp(L) by LDP-KwikSort:Lap pro-
duces the error < 6µ with probability at least 1−2−6µ, where µ = 2(m2 ) exp(−(1− e− 2K )2K · θ∗2nm(m−1))
and θ∗ = θ2−θ .
Based on Theorem 3, it is found that the estimation error of LDP-KwikSort:Lap also depends
on the expectation µ, and a smaller µ indicates a smaller error. We observe that when the privacy
budget , the number of agents n and alternatives m, and the dispersion parameter θ are fixed, µ
is influenced by the function g(K) = (1− e− 2K )2K, and it gets the approximate minimum value
when the number of queries K < 2 . Other observations are the same as LDP-KwikSort:RR, and in
the experiments we will verify these theoretical observations.
5.3 Computational Complexity
As shown in Table 2, we analyze the computational complexity of the proposed protocol with K
queries in terms of the following aspects:
Table 2: Computational complexity of LDP-KwikSort protocol
Complexity
Algorithm
Local perturbation Post-processing
Time
Agent O(K)
Curator O(nK) O(nK)+O(m2)+O(m logm)
Space
Agent O(logK)
Curator O(n logK) O(n logK)
Communication
Agent O(logK) O(logK)
Curator O(n logK) O(n logK)
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Running time. For each agent, in the local perturbation algorithm of solution LDP-KwikSort:RR,
the basic operations are generating random number K times and number comparison K times, thus
the complexity is O(K). For that of LDP-KwikSort:Lap, since the basic operations are generating
random number K times and addition K times, the complexity is also O(K).
On the curator’s side, in the local perturbation algorithms of two solutions, it is required to
generate K queries to each agent, thus the complexity is O(nK). For the post-processing algorithm,
the complexities of the classification phase and the estimation & computation phase are O(nK) and
O(
(
m
2
)
) ≈ O(m2), respectively. The execution of KwikSort algorithm consumes O(m logm). Thus,
the total time complexity of the curator’s operation is O(2nK) +O(m2) +O(m logm).
Processing memory. For each agent, the main processing memory lies in the K queries, which
consumes O(logK) bits. For the curator, as it maintains n times the sums of at most 2K bits for
each agent, the processing memory is O(2n logK) bits.
Communication cost. The number of queries directly impacts the communication cost, which
includes O(2 logK) for each agent and O(2n logK) for the curator.
6 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we present the performance evaluation of the LDP-KwikSort protocol and the
competitors on both real and synthetic datasets. Section 6.1 introduces the experiment settings,
and Section 6.2-6.5 investigate how will the parameters (number of queries K, privacy budget
, number of agent n and alternative m, and dispersion parameter θ) impact on performance.
Section 6.6 compares the time costs of involved solutions, and Section 6.7 provides a summarized
discussion.
6.1 Experiment Settings
6.1.1 Competitors
KwikSort. We adopt the approximate rank aggregation algorithm KwikSort described in [2] as
the non-private solution. Since each agent responds to each query with the true answer to the
curator, and the latter releases the aggregate ranking without adding any noise, the performances
of KwikSort can be seen as the empirical error lower bound in our experiments.
DP-KwikSort. We adopt the differentially private algorithm DP-KwikSort [21] as the solution
under the central model of DP. When executing this algorithm, each agent responds to each
query with the true answer to the curator, and the latter adopts the Laplace mechanism to
introduce noises during the rank aggregation. Specifically, the algorithm adds noises into the
results of the comparison function: c˜mpL(aj , al) = cmpL(aj , al) +Xdp where Xdp ∼ Lap(1/′) and
′ = /((m− 1) logm). Besides, the number of queries in DP-KwikSort is defaulted as K = (m2 ).
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6.1.2 Datasets and Configuration
The experiments are conducted on synthetic datasets and three real-world datasets (TurkDots,
TurkPuzzle and SUSHI). Among them, datasets TurkDots and TurkPuzzle [36] were collected from
the crowdsourcing marketplace Amazon Mechanical Turk, which respectively contains n = 795 and
n = 793 agents’ full ranking preference profiles over m = 4 alternatives. Dataset SUSHI [25] contains
the full rankings of m = 10 types of sushi from n = 5000 agents in a questionnaire survey. The
synthetic datasets were generated by the Mallows model with R package PerMallows 1.13 [24].
The involved protocols and algorithms are implemented in Python 2.7 based on the package
pwlistorder 0.1 [13], and executed on an Intel Core i5 − 3210M 2.50GHz machine with 6GB
memory. In each experiment, the protocols and algorithms were tested 30 times, and their mean
score of the adopted utility metrics was reported.
6.1.3 Utility Metrics
Error rate. In experiments we coin the measurement error rate to reflect how accurate the
estimated version of aggregate pairwise comparison profile ĉmp(L) agrees with the ground truth
cmp(L). Specifically, for all possible alternative pairs aj and al where j < l,
ErrorRate =
|{cmpL(aj , al) > 0 and ĉmpL(aj , al) < 0}|(
m
2
)
+
|{cmpL(aj , al) < 0 and ĉmpL(aj , al) > 0}|(
m
2
) . (4)
Average Kendall tau distance. As mentioned before, we measure the achieved accuracy of the
aggregate ranking L˜P by adopting the average Kendall tau distance K(L˜P ,L) = 1n
∑
i∈N K(L˜P , Li).
Furthermore, for the convenience of comparison with different m, we normalize the values by
m(m− 1)/2.
6.2 The Impact of Query Amount
The number of queries determines the amount of provided information about each agent’s private
ranking preference profile. Intuitively, a relatively large K helps the curator to generate an
approximate optimal aggregate ranking. However, for LDP-KwikSort protocol, since the overall
privacy budget  of each agent will be split into K parts for reporting each query, a large number
of queries will lead to more noises per answer, which may make the collected information chaotic.
According to the theoretical analysis in Section 5.2, we observe that two solutions of LDP-KwikSort
can get the approximate minimum error of estimation around K = 2 . To verify this conclusion,
we ran LDP-KwikSort:RR and LDP-KwikSort:Lap on three real-world datasets and three synthetic
datasets, and set the privacy budget  ∈ {1.0, 2.0, 4.0, 10.0} as well as varying the number of queries
K ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4,m + 1, (m2 )}, for observing how the parameter K impacts on the performance of
LDP-KwikSort under the utility metrics such as the error rate and the average Kendall tau distance.
The results are shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4.
The results demonstrate that these two solutions of LDP-KwikSort protocol can achieve the
approximate minimum error of estimation around K = 2 . For instance, when  = 1.0, 2.0, with the
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increasing number of queries, we observe that each solution gets a larger error and when K = 1 the
error is the global minimum. As for  = 4.0, 10.0, each solution achieves the minimum error when
K = 2 . We also observe that this property is more obvious on the synthetic datasets, which is due
to the theoretical conclusion being made on the assumption of the Mallows model. Thus, in the
following experiments, we relate the choice of K to the privacy budget , and select the appropriate
K by comparing the values of error functions g(K) at the integers which are less or large than 2 .
This strategy will help us to tune the solutions to their optimal performance.
6.3 The Impact of Privacy Budget
Next, we consider varying the privacy budget of each agent in the range {0.1, ..., 5.0}, and observe
how this parameter impacts on the performance of LDP-KwikSort:RR and LDP-KwikSort:Lap under
the utility metrics such as the error rate and the average Kendall tau distance. For the DP-KwikSort
algorithm, as it is based on the local model of DP and the consumption of the privacy budget is
originate from the curator, we also vary  ∈ {0.1, ..., 5.0}. In this experiment, we ran these two
solutions of LDP-KwikSort and its competitors on three real-world datasets and three synthetic
datasets. For the TurkDots, TurkPuzzle, and SUSHI datasets, the numbers of agents and alternatives
are fixed by default. For the synthetic datasets, we set their dispersion parameter θ = 0.25, 0.5, 0.75,
as well as n = 5000 and m = 15. The results are shown in Figure 5.
Firstly, the non-private KwikSort determines the overall lower error bound of average Kendall
tau distance, and DP-KwikSort can approach it with a small privacy budget, say  = 0.1. Secondly,
with increasing the privacy budget, both of LDP-KwikSort:RR and LDP-KwikSort:Lap get lower
errors, and the former outperforms the latter. Besides, the performance changing trends of solutions
under two metrics are consistent, which is due to the error rate reflecting the accuracy of intermediate
results while the average Kendall tau distance reflecting the utility of the aggregate ranking.
6.4 The Impact of Agent and Alternative Amount
Intuitively, more alternatives that need to be ranked challenge the protocols for generating an
optimal ranking. In order to maintain the results with an acceptable utility, the increase of the
number of agents may help the curator to collect more information for rank aggregation. To
investigate how the numbers of agents n and alternatives m impact on the performance, we ran
these two solutions of LDP-KwikSort and its competitors on three real-world datasets and nine
synthetic datasets, and consider to vary n ∈ {10, ..., 10000} and m ∈ {4, 10, 15, 30, 45}, for observing
the performance under the average Kendall tau distance. The results are shown in Figure 6.
In Figure 6(a)-Figure 6(c), all the solutions are executed on the real-world datasets in which
the number of alternatives are fixed by default and the privacy budget is set to  = 2.0. Firstly,
we observe that KwikSort algorithm still shows the lower error bound of the average Kendall tau
distance. For instance, in Figure 6(b), with increasing the number of agents from n = 10 to n = 100,
KwikSort can achieve the average Kendall tau distance below 0.4 and get stable even with larger
agent amount. And we further observe that when the number of agents is less than the number
of possible pairs of alternatives
(
m
2
)
, KwikSort cannot aggregate a sufficient pairwise comparison
profile in which each pairwise comparison cmpL(aj , al) should be non-zero, which challenges the
generation of optimal aggregate ranking. Secondly, the results show that LDP-KwikSort:RR still
outperforms LDP-KwikSort:Lap. Generally, the involved solutions show the tendency of convergence
as the increasing number of agents.
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Figure 3: Performance of LDP-KwikSort:RR in terms of error rate and average Kendall tau distance
on the real-world and synthetic datasets, across varying the number of queries K.
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Figure 4: Performance of LDP-KwikSort:Lap in terms of error rate and average Kendall tau distance
on the real-world and synthetic datasets, across varying the number of queries K.
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Figure 5: Comparison of protocols in terms of error rate and average Kendall tau distance on the
real-world and synthetic datasets, across varying the privacy budget  ∈ {0.1, ...5.0}.
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Figure 6: Comparison of protocols in terms of average Kendall tau distance on the real-world and
synthetic datasets, across varying the number of agents n. Privacy budget  is fixed at 2.0.
21
In Figure 6(d)-Figure 6(l), we run all the solutions on the synthetic datasets with θ ∈
{0.25, 0.5, 0.75}, varying the number of agents in a much larger range from n = 100 to n = 10000,
and observe the performance of average Kendall tau distance under m ∈ {15, 30, 45} and  = 2.0.
Firstly, the results show that with an increasing number of alternatives from m = 15 to m = 45, the
lower error bound by KwikSort is decreasing, but it is much harder for the LDP-KwikSort protocol
to achieve this bound unless given a large number of agents. For instance, when given m = 15
alternatives, LDP-KwikSort:RR outperforms LDP-KwikSort:Lap by 8.1% at n = 2500, but with
increasing m to 30, LDP-KwikSort:RR needs more agents, say n = 7500, to achieve the improvement
of 9.8%. Secondly, with increasing the number of alternatives, it will be more obvious to see the
gap between LDP-KwikSort:RR and LDP-KwikSort:Lap. For instance, when setting θ = 0.5 and
n = 2500, their gaps at m = 15, m = 30 and m = 45 are 2.4%, 11% and 32.5%, respectively.
6.5 The Impact of Dispersion Parameter
In the above experiments, the dispersion parameters of synthetic dataset θ = 0.25, θ = 0.5 and
θ = 0.75 are involved, which reflects the generated rankings are closer to the ground truth ranking.
From the results in Figure 6, all solutions achieve lower average Kendall tau distance, which
demonstrates the theoretical conclusions in Section 5.2. Besides, with increasing the dispersion
parameter, it will be more obvious to see the gap between LDP-KwikSort:RR and LDP-KwikSort:Lap.
For instance, when setting m = 45 and n = 5000, their gaps at θ = 0.25, θ = 0.5 and θ = 0.75 are
13.5%, 33.4% and 46.5%, respectively.
6.6 Time Cost
Finally, we compare the time costs of all the solutions on three real-world datasets and five
synthetic datasets. The results are shown in Table 3. We observe that KwikSort consumes the
least execution time and the time increases with more alternatives because no noise introduced. On
the basis of the former, the central model based DP-KwikSort algorithm shows a small increase in
time cost. The cases of LDP-KwikSort protocol present the sum of the execution time of all the
agents and the curator. We observe that when the number of alternatives are relatively small, say
m = 4, 5, LDP-KwikSort:RR consumes less time than LDP-KwikSort:Lap. When increasing m from
15, LDP-KwikSort:RR needs more time cost.
Table 3: Comparison of protocols in terms of time cost (in seconds)
Solution
Dataset TurkDots
795, 4
TurkPuzzle
793, 4
SUSHI
5000, 10
Mallows
5000, 5
Mallows
5000, 10
Mallows
5000, 15
Mallows
5000, 30
Mallows
5000, 45
KwikSort 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0005 0.0007
DP-KwikSort 0.0006 0.0006 0.0030 0.0008 0.0030 0.0076 0.0285 0.0626
LDP-KwikSort:RR 0.1255 0.1244 2.7076 2.5783 2.6125 2.8551 3.3530 4.4113
LDP-KwikSort:Lap 0.1751 0.1732 2.9088 2.9015 2.9026 2.9294 2.9812 3.1288
6.7 Discussion
The above experimental results demonstrate that the proposed LDP-KwikSort can satisfy -local
differential privacy or -local individual differential privacy while maintaining the acceptable utility
of the aggregate ranking. Particularly, under the utility metrics such as the error rate and the
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average Kendall tau distance, solution LDP-KwikSort:RR generally outperforms LDP-KwikSort:Lap
and can achieve the closest performance of DP-KwikSort. When using the proposed protocol in an
agent scale as n = 5000, we recommend  = 1.0 for the situations with fewer alternatives such as
m ≤ 15, and  = 3.0 when considering a relatively large number of alternatives.
Due to the natural shortcoming of the local model of DP, the observed limitation of this work
relies on the relatively large privacy budget to maintain the acceptable utility, compare with that of
central model based solutions. The potential optimization methods include the consideration of
personalized privacy settings.
7 Conclusion
Rank aggregation aims to combine different agents’ preferences over the given alternatives into an
aggregate ranking that agrees with the most with all the preferences. In the scenario of crowdsourced
data management, since the aggregation procedure relies on a data curator, the privacy within the
agents’ preference data could be compromised when the curator is untrusted. All existing works
that guarantee differential privacy in rank aggregation assume that the data curator is trusted.
This paper first formalizes and studies the locally differentially private rank aggregation (LDP-
RA) problem. Specifically, we design the LDP-KwikSort protocol which could protect the pairwise
comparison within the ranking list. It also shows a combination of the properties from the
approximate rank aggregation algorithm KwikSort, the RR mechanism, and the Laplace mechanism.
Theoretical analysis and empirical results on the real-world and synthetic datasets confirm that our
protocol especially the solution LDP-KwikSort:RR can achieve strong local privacy protection while
maintaining an acceptable utility.
Future work will include the following three aspects: 1) considering strategic voting behaviors
and exploring the trade-off between the soundness, the usefulness and the privacy preservation in
LDP-RA; 2) extending our approach to support personalized privacy budget setting for different
agents; 3) the evaluation of the synthetic rank datasets based on other mixture models such as the
Plackett-Luce model and the general random utility model.
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